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We	   critically	   examine	   the	   claim	   by	   Otávio	   Bueno	   (Bueno	   O.	   2014.	   “Why	   identity	   is	  
fundamental”.	   American	   Philosophical	   Quarterly	   51,	   325-­‐332)	   that	   identity	   is	   a	  
fundamental	  concept.	  Bueno	  advances	   four	   related	  theses	   in	  order	   to	  ground	  such	  a	  
claim:	  1)	  identity	  is	  presupposed	  in	  every	  conceptual	  system;	  2)	  identity	  is	  required	  to	  
characterize	   an	   individual;	   3)	   identity	   cannot	   be	   defined;	   4)	   the	   intelligibility	   of	  
quantification	  requires	  identity.	  We	  address	  each	  of	  these	  points	  and	  argue	  that	  there	  
are	  no	  compelling	   reasons	   to	  hold	   that	   identity	   is	   fundamental	   in	   these	  cases.	  So,	   in	  




In	   Bueno	   2014,	   Otávio	   Bueno	   has	   raised	   several	   arguments	   to	   the	   effect	   that	   the	  
concept	   of	   identity	   should	   be,	   in	   some	   sense,	   fundamental.	   In	   particular,	   Bueno	  
challenges	  the	  Received	  View	  on	  quantum	  particles	  non-­‐individuality	  (see	  below),	  the	  
interpretation	   of	   non-­‐relativistic	   quantum	  mechanics	   according	   to	   which	   the	   theory	  
deals	  with	  non-­‐individual	  entities;	   that	   is,	  entities	  with	  no	   identity	   conditions.	   In	   this	  
paper	  we	  shall	  examine	  Bueno’s	  claims	  to	  the	  fundamentality	  of	  identity	  and	  we	  shall	  
argue	  that	  they	  are	  not	  enough	  to	  impose	  the	  general	  thesis	  that	  identity,	  in	  a	  sense	  to	  
be	  specified,	  should	  hold	  universally.	  	  
	  
There	   are	   four	   related	   claims	   whose	   aims	   would	   be	   to	   grant	   the	   fundamentality	  
character	   of	   identity:	   (1)	   identity	   is	   presupposed	   in	   every	   conceptual	   system;	   (2)	  
identity	  is	  required	  to	  characterize	  an	  individual;	  (3)	  identity	  cannot	  be	  defined;	  (4)	  the	  
intelligibility	   of	   quantification	   requires	   identity.	   In	   the	   end,	   as	   we	   have	   already	  
remarked,	   Bueno	   discusses	   the	   relation	   of	   identity	   and	   the	   plausibility	   of	   an	  
interpretation	  of	  non-­‐relativistic	  quantum	  mechanics	  according	   to	  which	   it	  makes	  no	  
sense	   to	   attribute	   identity	   to	   its	   entities.	   His	   claim,	   in	   a	   nutshell,	   was	   that	   this	  
interpretation	   in	   implausible,	   given	   the	   fundamentality	   of	   identity	   he	   sought	   to	  
establish.	  
	  
Here	  we	  shall	  go	  though	  each	  of	  the	  four	  topics	  presented	  to	  grant	  the	  fundamentality	  
of	   identity	   and	   try	   to	   bring	   to	   light	   what	   we	   believe	   to	   be	   their	   weaknesses	   (here,	  
whenever	  we	  mention	  Bueno,	  it	  is	  the	  (2014)	  paper	  that	  we	  are	  referring	  to).	  The	  very	  
idea	  of	  what	   is	   the	  concept	  of	   identity	   is	  not	  clear	   in	  Bueno’s	  paper,	  and	  the	  precise	  
notion	  of	  “fundamental”	  being	  considered	  is	  not	  presented	  either.	  The	  idea	  seems	  to	  
be	   that	   identity	   is	   fundamental	   because	   it	   has	   the	   features	   presented	   in	   the	   four	  
mentioned	  uses,	  so	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  eliminated	  and	  no	  metaphysical	  system	  —	  and	  no	  
interpretation	  of	  quantum	  mechanics	  either	  —	  can	  be	  formulated	  without	  the	  use	  of	  a	  
universally	  applicable	  relation	  of	  identity.	  	  
	  
2.	  Identity	  may	  not	  be	  so	  fundamental	  	  	  
	  
Now,	   we	   present	   the	   arguments	   advanced	   for	   the	   fundamentality	   of	   identity	   and	  
discuss	  their	  merits.	  	  
	  
2.1.	  Identity	  and	  conceptual	  systems	  
	  
Bueno	  begins	  his	  paper	  by	  considering	  the	  role	  of	  identity	  in	  conceptual	  systems.	  The	  
application	   of	   concepts,	   Bueno	   says,	   requires	   identity.	   Bueno	   begins	   describing	   the	  
role	  of	  concepts:	  “[t]he	  most	  basic	  feature	  of	  concepts	  is	  to	  demarcate	  certain	  things	  
from	   others,	   to	   draw	   a	   line	   between	   those	   things	   that	   fall	   under	   that	   concept	   and	  
those	  that	  don’t”.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  this,	  identity	  would	  be	  fundamental:	  “[c]oncepts	  
are	  used	  to	  classify	  objects,	  to	  make	  distinctions	  among	  them	  together	  as	  falling	  under	  
the	   same	   concept	   […]	   [and	   this]	   demand[s]	   identity”.	   The	   second	   claim	   concerns	  
objects	  falling	  under	  the	  same	  concept,	  which	  also	  requires	  identity	  because	  to	  “lump	  
certain	  things	  together	  requires	  that	  they	  fall	  under	  the	  same	  concept”.	  	  
	  
As	  a	  matter	  of	  clarity,	  we	  should	  distinguish	  the	  two	  claims	  more	  sharply	  now.	  The	  first	  
claim	  concerns	  the	  identity	  of	  objects	  falling	  under	  a	  concept;	  the	  second	  concerns	  the	  
identity	   of	   the	   concepts	   themselves.	   The	   first	   argument	   seems	   to	   be	   as	   follows:	   in	  
order	   to	   determine	   the	   extension	   of	   a	   concept,	   we	   must	   determine	   also	   its	  
complement.	   Things	   that	   fall	   under	   a	   concept	   cannot	   be	   in	   the	   complement	   of	   the	  
concept:	   those	   would	   be	   distinct	   things.	   So,	   identity	   would	   be	   required	   in	   order	   to	  
distinguish	   the	   items	   in	   the	   extension	   of	   a	   concept	   and	   the	   items	   belonging	   to	   its	  
complement.	  To	  illustrate	  this	  point,	  let	  us	  assume	  that	  a	  concept	  C	  is	  given	  together	  
with	  objects	  o1	  and	  o2,	  so	  that	  o1	  falls	  under	  C	  and	  o2	  does	  not	  fall	  under	  C.	  In	  this	  case,	  
o1	   is	   distinct	   from	   o2.	   So,	   identity	   is	   required,	   given	   that	   it	   enables	   a	   meaningfully	  
application	  of	  concepts.	  	  
	  
Our	   first	   complaint	   against	   this	   line	  of	   reasoning	   is	   that	   it	   begs	   the	  question	   against	  
those	  that	  do	  not	  recognize	  the	  fundamentality	  of	  identity	  in	  the	  sense	  focused	  now.	  
In	  fact,	  for	  those	  that	  do	  not	  want	  a	  commitment	  with	  identity,	  the	  situation	  may	  be	  
analysed	   in	  an	  alternative	  way,	  by	  employing	  a	  weaker	  notion	  of	  discernibility:	  given	  
that	  C	  distinguishes	  between	  o1	  and	  o2,	  they	  are	  discernible.	  Does	  discernibility	  imply	  
distinctness,	  so	  that	  the	  use	  of	  identity	  is	  really	  unavoidable?	  Well,	  it	  depends	  on	  our	  
understanding	   of	   the	   relation	   between	   identity	   and	   indiscernibility	   (more	   on	   this	  
relation	  in	  the	  next	  topic).	  We	  believe	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  indiscernibility	  can	  be	  analysed	  
without	  necessarily	   implying	   identity	   in	  some	  systems	  of	   logic	  shows	  that	  there	   is	  no	  
equivalence	  between	   these	  notions.	  At	   the	  very	   least,	   it	   is	   logically	  possible	   that	   the	  
relations	  of	  discernibility	  and	  difference	  are	  not	   the	  same,	  with	  discernibility	  being	  a	  
weaker	   notion.	   In	   this	   case,	   there	   is	   an	   alternative	  way	   to	   understand	   the	   situation	  
described	   by	   Bueno	   without	   necessarily	   using	   identity.	   So,	   if	   this	   is	   correct,	   then	  
identity	  is	  not	  really	  fundamental	  for	  the	  meaningful	  application	  of	  concepts.	  
	  
Even	  though	  we	  do	  not	  enter	   into	  the	  details	  of	  the	  difference	  between	   identity	  and	  
indiscernibility,	   there	   are	   several	   systems	   of	   logic	  which	  we	   could	   call	   upon	   here	   to	  
substantiate	  our	  claim,	  and	  which	  keep	  discernibility	  and	  difference	  apart:	  Schrödinger	  
logics	   and	   quasi-­‐set	   theory	   (see	   French	   and	   Krause	   2006,	   chaps.	   7	   and	   8),	   and	   also	  
Wittgenstein	  logics	  (see	  a	  discussion	  in	  Wehmeier	  2012).	  Also,	  even	  first-­‐order	  classical	  
logic	  with	  identity	  using	  so-­‐called	  non-­‐normal	  models	  sometimes	  interprets	  the	  symbol	  
of	  identity	  with	  a	  relation	  that	  is	  mere	  indiscernibility	  (see	  Mendelson	  2010,	  p.93).	  	  
	  
For	   a	   second	   complaint	   about	   this	   argument,	   we	   point	   to	   one	   undesirable	  
consequence	   of	   the	   view:	   it	   would	   render	   an	   intuitive	   interpretation	   of	  
paraconsistency	  —	   and	   along	   with	   it,	   versions	   of	   dialetheism	  —	   untenable.	   In	   fact,	  
consider	  a	  contradictory	  object,	   like	  Russell’s	  set	  R,	  one	  of	   the	   favourite	  examples	  of	  
paraconsistentists	   (one	  can	  take	  as	  example	  any	  one	  of	   the	  so-­‐called	  “contradictory”	  
objects	   available	   in	   the	   literature).	  Now,	  R	   satisfies	   both	   the	   concept	  defining	  R	   and	  
does	  not	  satisfy	  it	  (the	  concept	  is	  “does	  not	  belong	  to	  itself”).	  So,	  if	  paraconsistent	  set	  
theories	   allowing	   sets	   like	   R	   are	   supposed	   to	  make	   sense,	   then	   they	   cannot	   accept	  
Bueno’s	  account	  of	  how	  concepts	  are	  applied.	  Otherwise,	  they	  won’t	  be	  able	  to	  make	  
sense	  of	  their	  contradictory	  objects:	  the	  set	  R	  must	  be	  in	  its	  extension	  and	  also	  not	  to	  
be	   in	   its	   extension.	   Alternatively,	   if	   one	   does	   not	   want	   to	   be	   committed	   with	  
extensions	   in	   this	   pathological	   case,	   one	   can	   keep	  with	   R	   falling	   under	   the	   concept	  
defining	  R	  and	  also	  does	  not	  falling	  under	  this	  concept.	  On	  Bueno’s	  account,	  this	  would	  
imply	  either	   that	   this	  application	  of	  concepts	   is	  meaningless	  or	  else	   that	  R	   is	  distinct	  
from	  itself.	  	  
	  
One	  way	  to	  go	  out	  of	  this	  situation	  could	  be	  to	  rule	  out	  paraconsistent	  logics	  with	  such	  
an	  intuitive	  semantics.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  palatable	  move,	  we	  think,	  and	  we	  shall	  not	  pursue	  
it	   here.	  Another	   alternative	   consists	   in	   changing	   the	   interpretation	  of	   how	  we	   apply	  
concepts,	  so	  that	  paraconsistent	  objects	  can	  make	  sense	  after	  all.	  But	  this	  would	  rule	  
out	  Bueno’s	  account	  of	  concepts	   (along	  with	   its	  allegedly	  required	  use	  of	   identity).	  A	  
third	  way	  would	  be	  to	  keep	  the	  conclusion	  that	  R	  is	  really	  distinct	  from	  itself,	  but	  this	  is	  
very	  difficult	  to	  make	  sense	  from	  an	  intuitive	  point	  of	  view,	  independently	  of	  whether	  
one	  thinks	  that	  identity	  is	  either	  fundamental	  or	  not.	  
	  
Now,	   going	   directly	   to	   the	   case	   that	   concerns	   us,	   that	   is,	   the	   case	   of	   quantum	  
mechanics,	  we	  shall	  point	  out	  that	  the	  use	  of	  concepts	  in	  this	  domain	  is	  illustrative	  of	  
how	   identity	   is	   not	   involved	   as	   Bueno	   suggests.	   In	   fact,	   it	   is	   usually	   held	   that	   the	  
properties	   of	   quantum	   objects	   are	   nor	   discovered	   by	   inspection;	   for	   instance,	   Dalla	  
Chiara	  and	  Toraldo	  di	  Francia	  have	  suggested	  that	  quantum	  objects	  are	  nomological,	  
given	  by	  physical	   law,	  and	  that	  all	  objects	  of	  a	  same	  kind	  obey	  exactly	  the	  same	  laws	  
that	   characterize	   them,	   so	   they	   could	   be	   discerned	   by	   none	   of	   such	   qualities	   (this	  
notion,	  and	   its	  problems,	   is	   further	  discussed	   in	  French	  and	  Krause	  2006,	  p.221ff).	   In	  
other	  words,	  we	  have	  clear	  classifications	  of	  these	  entities	  as	  conceptual	  systems,	  even	  
they	   being	   indiscernible	   from	   one	   another	   (without	   being	   identical).	   Identity,	   in	   the	  
sense	   described,	   is	   not	   required	   here	   (we	   remark	   that	   Bueno	   did	   not	   say	   what	   he	  
understands	  by	   identity),	   for	  what	  we	  need	   is	  a	  criterion	   for	   something	   to	  be,	   say,	  a	  
positron	   or	   a	   Z	   particle,	   and	  we	   do	   not	   require	   the	   identity	   (in	   the	   above	   sense)	   of	  
these	   particles	   themselves.	   Okay,	   you	   may	   say:	   identity	   is	   required	   in	   order	   of	  
distinguishing	   positrons	   from	   Z	   particles.	   But	   this	   is	   a	   way	   of	   speech.	   As	   suggested	  
above,	  all	  we	  need	  is	  that	  positrons	  and	  Z	  particles	  be	  discernible,	  a	  weaker	  notion.	  In	  
regimenting	  natural	  talk	  for	  metaphysical	  purposes,	  it	  suffices	  to	  use	  discernibility,	  and	  
not	  necessarily	  identity.	  
	  
Now,	   we	   go	   to	   the	   second	   of	   Bueno’s	   claims,	   that	   one	   concerning	   the	   identity	   of	  
concepts:	  when	  objects	   o1	   and	  o2	   are	   similar	   on	   one	   specific	   aspect	   (described	   by	   a	  
concept),	   this	   would	   only	   happen	   because	   they	   fall	   under	   the	   same	   concept.	   So	  
identity	   of	   concepts	   would	   be	   required	   for	   the	   very	   application	   of	   concepts.	   For	  
instance,	  when	  we	  say	  that	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  are	  philosophers,	  they	  must	  fall	  under	  
the	   same	   concept	   “being	   a	   philosopher”.	   In	   this	   sense,	   there	   must	   be	   identity	   for	  
concepts	  too.	  	  
	  
Our	  view	  on	  this	  issue	  is,	  once	  again,	  that	  identity	  is	  really	  not	  so	  fundamental.	  First	  of	  
all,	   if	   concepts	   are	   understood	   extensionally,	   then	   their	   identity	  will	   depend	   on	   the	  
identity	   of	   the	   objects	   that	   fall	   under	   them	   (on	   an	   intuitive	   understanding	   of	  
extensionality).	  This	  won’t	  fit	  very	  well	  with	  Bueno’s	  claim	  that	  identity	  is	  fundamental,	  
because	  in	  this	  case	  the	  identity	  of	  concepts	  would	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  identity	  
of	   the	  objects	   falling	  under	   them,	  something	  that	  cannot	  be	  done	  for	  a	   fundamental	  
concept	   (see	   further	   ahead).	   On	   an	   intensional	   understanding	   of	   concepts,	   on	   the	  
other	  hand,	  it	  is	  notoriously	  difficult	  to	  account	  for	  the	  identity	  of	  concepts,	  and	  given	  
that	  no	  such	  account	  was	  advanced	  by	  Bueno,	  we	  believe	  that	  he	  unintentionally	  was	  
thinking	  in	  extensional	  terms.	  	  
	  
To	   advance	   even	   further	   our	   claim,	   we	   hold	   that	   the	   situation	   described	   could	   be	  
analysed	  in	  an	  alternative	  way.	  To	  say	  that	  a	  concept	  like	  “being	  a	  philosopher”	  applies	  
to	  Aristotle	  and	  Plato	  does	  not	  require	  anything	  like	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  concept	  “being	  
a	  philosopher”.	  For,	  changing	  now	  to	  the	  material	  mode,	  going	  from	  concepts	  to	  their	  
metaphysical	  representatives,	  one	  could	  for	  instance	  be	  a	  trope	  theorist,	  and	  deny	  that	  
it	   is	  the	  same	  trope	  that	  applies	  to	  both	  individuals,	  as	  trope	  theorists	   in	  fact	  do.	  We	  
are	   aware	   that	   trope	   theories	   are	   not	  without	   problems,	   but	   even	   so	   they	   serve	   to	  
emphasize	  that	  one	  cannot	  go	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  same	  linguistic	  entity	  (a	  concept),	  
being	  applied	   to	  distinct	  names,	  has	  an	  ontological	   counterpart	   (a	  universal?)	   that	   is	  
the	  same	   in	  both	  cases,	   thus	   requiring	   identity.	  That	   is,	  Bueno’s	  conclusion	  does	  not	  
follow	  so	  straightforwardly.	  
	  
Of	  course,	  one	  could	  complain	  about	  our	  change	  to	  the	  material	  mode.	  Perhaps	  in	  the	  
formal	  mode,	  linguistically,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  single	  concept	  applying	  to	  each	  particular	  
object	   that	   falls	  under	   it,	   so	   that	   at	   least	   this	   linguistic	   entity	  must	  have	  an	   identity.	  
That	  is,	  even	  if	  a	  concept	  refers	  to	  various	  tropes	  when	  it	  is	  applied,	  as	  a	  concept	  (i.e.	  a	  
linguistic	   entity),	   it	   is	   just	   one.	  But	  notice	   that	   this	   only	   shows	  one	   thing:	   that	   some	  
abstract	   linguistic	  entities,	   types	  of	   concepts,	  have	  multiple	   instantiations	  on	  various	  
tokens.	   To	   recognize	   that	   a	   token	   is	   an	   instance	   of	   a	   type,	   no	   use	   of	   identity	   is	  
required.	  	  
	  
2.2.	  Identity	  and	  individuality	  
	  
As	  a	  second	  point	  concerning	  the	  fundamentality	  of	  identity,	  Bueno	  argues	  for	  the	  fact	  
that	   identity	   is	   required	   to	   define	   individuals.	   Individuality	   being	   a	   central	   issue	   in	  
metaphysics,	  this	  would	  be	  an	  important	  aspect	  to	  be	  considered	  (see	  Lowe	  2003	  for	  a	  
general	   discussion	   on	   individuality).	   According	   to	   Bueno,	   individuality	   is	   defined	   as	  
comprising	   two	   minimal	   conditions:	   i)	   individuals	   are	   discernible	   from	   other	   things	  
(discernibility	  condition)	  and	  ii)	  individuals	  would	  be	  re-­‐identifiable	  through	  time.	  Now,	  
both	  conditions	  are	  said	  to	  involve	  identity:	  discernibility	  requires	  difference,	  while	  re-­‐
identification	  requires	  that	  an	  item	  re-­‐identified	  must	  be	  the	  same	  at	  the	  two	  distinct	  
instants	  of	  time.	  	  
	  
Our	   first	   point	   is	   that	   this	   line	   of	   argument	   is	   off	   the	   mark:	   one	   could	   accept	   that	  
individuals	   are	   characterized	   by	   at	   least	   these	   two	   conditions	   and	   still	   hold	   that	  
identity	  is	  not	  fundamental.	  In	  fact,	  for	  the	  conclusion	  that	  identity	  is	  fundamental	  to	  
go	  through,	  one	  would	  still	  have	  to	  add	  the	  premise	  that	  every	  object	  is	  an	  individual,	  
or	   something	   to	   that	   effect.	   However,	   if	   there	   are	   objects	   that	   are	   not	   individuals,	  
then,	   they	   may	   not	   obey	   the	   conditions	   for	   individuality,	   so	   that	   they	   may	   be	  
characterized	  according	  to	  conditions	  that	  do	  not	  require	  identity	  (and	  identity	   is	  not	  
fundamental	   if	   that	   is	   the	   case).	   In	   fact,	   assuming	   that	   there	   are	   non-­‐individuals	  
amounts	   to	   such	   an	   option:	   some	   objects	   “have	   identity”	   (in	   some	   sense	   to	   be	  
specified),	  while	  others	  do	  not.	  	  
	  
So,	  to	  establish	  his	  conclusion,	  Bueno	  has	  to	  grant	  two	  things:	  that	  those	  requirements	  
are	  in	  fact	  minimal	  for	  individuality,	  and	  that	  there	  are	  no	  items	  that	  could	  be	  objects	  
without	   being	   individuals.	   The	   second	   point	   seems	   crucial	   for	   us	   if	   the	   thesis	   that	  
identity	   is	   fundamental	   is	   to	   be	   established.	   It	   would	   be	   the	   one	   granting	   universal	  
applicability	  of	  identity.	  However,	  Bueno	  does	  not	  present	  any	  argument	  to	  that	  effect,	  
so	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  why	  identity	  should	  be	  fundamental	  just	  because	  it	  is	  used	  
to	   define	   individuality.	   Of	   course,	   one	   could	   still	   assume	   that	   a	   concept	   can	   be	   of	  
restricted	  application	  and	  still	  be	  fundamental;	  however,	  if	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  once	  again	  
we	  don’t	  have	  to	  worry,	  because	  we	  can	  simply	  leave	  individuals	  as	  being	  those	  things	  
having	  identity	  and	  non-­‐individuals	  as	  those	  things	  that	  do	  not	  have	  identity.	  	  
	  
The	   first	   point,	   the	   one	   concerning	   the	  minimal	   conditions	   for	   individuality,	   involves	  
also	   great	   controversies.	   Both	   the	   requirement	   of	   discernibility	   and	   the	   re-­‐
identification	   requirement	   seem	   to	   be	   too	  much	   to	   demand	   on	   something	   to	   be	   an	  
individual.	  We	  begin	  by	  discussing	  the	  demand	  of	  discernibility.	  	  
	  
Traditionally,	   discernibility	   is	   treated	   as	   a	   distinct	   notion	   from	   numerical	   difference.	  
Discernibility	   concerns	   our	   epistemology,	   dealing	   only	   with	   what	   we	   are	   able	   to	  
discern,	   while	   difference	   concerns	   metaphysics,	   having	   to	   do	   with	   the	   numerical	  
distinctness	   of	   items,	   even	   if	   never	   discovered	   by	   us.	   To	  make	   the	   difference	   clear,	  
philosophers	  tend	  to	  present	  a	  thought	  experiment	  according	  to	  which	  we	  are	  asked	  
to	  imagine	  a	  possible	  world	  in	  which	  there	  is	  only	  one	  object.	  This	  object	  is	  identical	  to	  
itself,	   but	  not	  discernible	   from	  anything	  else,	   so	   that	   the	   concepts	  of	  difference	  and	  
discernibility	  do	  not	  coincide.	  	  
	  
Bueno	  claims	  that	  the	  example	  is	  not	  uncontroversial,	  and	  that	  there	  are	  already	  lots	  
of	  arguments	  in	  the	  literature	  against	  possible	  worlds	  with	  only	  one	  object.	  Anyway,	  he	  
claims,	   even	   if	   the	   example	   holds,	   it	   is	   not	   so	   easy	   to	   separate	   difference	   from	  
discernibility:	  the	  single	  object	  o	  could	  have	  modal	  properties,	   like	  “being	  discernible	  
from	  every	  other	  object	  that	  could	  have	  existed”,	  or,	  if	  indiscernible	  objects	  could	  have	  
existed,	  the	  class	  of	  the	  indiscernibles	  from	  object	  o	  would	  have	  to	  be	  distinct	  from	  the	  
class	  of	  the	  indiscernibles	  from	  other	  objects	  discernible	  from	  o.	  So,	  identity	  would	  be	  
required	  anyway.	  	  
	  
We	  should	  point	  that	  this	  is	  already	  a	  change	  of	  subject:	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  object	  could	  
have	   such	   and	   such	   modal	   properties	   does	   not	   help	   us	   in	   characterizing	   its	  
individuality.	  For	  instance,	  to	  say	  that	  Socrates	  could	  have	  been	  a	  truck	  driver	  does	  not	  
help	   us	   in	   characterizing	   his	   ‘actual’	   individuality.	   Recall	   that	   the	   individuality	   of	   an	  
individual,	  intuitively,	  is	  precisely	  that	  which	  makes	  a	  thing	  being	  what	  it	  is,	  not	  what	  it	  
could	  be.	  So,	  modal	  properties	  seem	  to	  be	  of	  little	  help	  to	  the	  original	  problem.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	   Bueno	   has	   nothing	   to	   say	   about	   symmetrical	   universes	   comprising	  
indiscernible	  objects.	  Those	  universes,	   like	  Max	  Black’s	  universe	  comprising	  only	   two	  
indiscernible	  spheres	   (Black	  1952),	   seem	  to	  require	   that	   individuality	   is	  characterized	  
by	   something	   not	   involving	   qualities	   and	   discernibility,	   but	   rather	   in	   terms	   of	   other	  
features	  which	   could	   grant	   individuality	   without	   discernibility.	   The	   case	   of	   quantum	  
particles	  is	  also	  a	  great	  example.	  As	  Bueno	  himself	  acknowledges,	  sometimes	  quantum	  
particles	   are	   interpreted	   as	   being	   individuals.	   However,	   their	   individuality	   is	   not	  
understood	  as	  grounded	  on	  discernibility,	  but	  rather	  through	  some	  other	  individuation	  
principle	   that	   would	   allow	   for	   indiscernible	   individuals,	   like	   a	   primitive	   thisness,	   a	  
haecceity,	  or	  a	  substratum.	  	  
	  
To	  make	  this	  point	  even	  clearer,	  we	  could	  distinguish	  between	  two	  senses	  of	  identity:	  
(i)	   identity	  as	  a	  relation,	  which	  says	  that	  there	  is	  one	  thing	  (and	  whose	  negation	  says	  
that	  there	  are	  two	  things),	  and	  (ii)	  identity	  as	  a	  metaphysical	  notion,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  
thisness	   or	   a	   haecceity	   which	   every	   individual	   is	   supposed	   to	   have	   and	   which	  
characterizes	   each	   thing	   as	   the	   very	   thing	   it	   is.	   In	   the	   first	   sense,	   identity	   is	   not	  
required	   to	   characterize	   an	   individual,	   it	  merely	   expresses	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   is	   just	  
one	   or	   that	   there	   are	   more	   things.	   In	   the	   second	   sense,	   identity	   is	   required	   to	  
characterize	  individuality	  according	  to	  some	  accounts	  of	  individuality	  (again,	  see	  Lowe	  
2003).	  However,	  some	  philosophers	  prefer	  to	  attribute	  some	  form	  of	  primitive	  identity	  
to	  things	  and	  not	  commit	  themselves	  with	  concepts	  such	  as	  haecceity	  and	  thisnesses	  
(see	  Dorato	  and	  Morganti	  2013).	  
	  
Now	  we	  would	  like	  to	  discuss	  the	  idea	  that	  numerical	  identity,	  given	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
whatever	   collection	   having	   a	   cardinal	   greater	   than	   one	   necessarily	   entails	   that	   the	  
elements	  of	  the	  collection	  are	  different,	  does	  not	  hold	  either.	  Indeed,	  we	  may	  say	  that	  
the	   very	   notion	   of	   cardinality	   is	   common	   to	   both	   individuals	   and	   non-­‐individuals.	  
Individuals	  may	  have	   identity	  given	  by	  some	  form	  of	  primitive	   identity,	   some	  kind	  of	  
haecceity,	  and	  may	  even	  be	  discernible	  from	  every	  other	   individual	  (it	  all	  depends	  on	  
which	   definition	   is	   adopted),	  while	   non-­‐individuals	   do	   not	   have	   identity,	  which	   does	  
not	  imply	  that	  they	  cannot	  be	  taken	  as	  many.	  Both	  individuals	  and	  non-­‐individuals	  can	  
be	  aggregated	   in	   collections	  with	  a	   cardinal,	  but	  only	   individuals	  may	  be	   in	  principle	  
discerned	   from	  other	   individuals	  of	   the	  same	  kind.	   In	   fact,	   let	  us	   recall	   the	  origins	  of	  
modern	  chemistry.	  John	  Dalton	  explicitly	  claimed,	  long	  time	  ago,	  that	  “[t]herefore	  we	  
may	  conclude	  that	  the	  ultimate	  particles	  of	  all	  homogeneous	  bodies	  are	  perfectly	  alike	  
in	  weight,	  figure,	  &c.	  In	  other	  words,	  every	  particle	  of	  water	  is	  like	  every	  other	  particle	  
of	   water,	   every	   particle	   of	   hydrogen	   is	   like	   every	   other	   particle	   of	   hydrogen,	   &c.”	  
(Dalton	  1808,	  p.143).	  From	  this	  time	  on,	  it	  was	  realized	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  
number.	  With	  Dalton,	  we	  have	  started	   in	  writing	  (in	  present	  day	  notation)	  things	   like	  
H2O,	   C2H4,	   etc.,	   emphasizing	   that	   it	   is	   not	   the	   individuality	   of	   the	   components	   that	  
matters,	  but	  their	  species	  (and	  number!).	   Indeed,	   in	  a	  typical	  chemical	  reaction,	  such	  
as	  in	  the	  combustion	  of	  methane,	  we	  have	  CH4	  +	  2	  O2	  →	  CO2	  +	  2	  H2O,	  plus	  energy.	  In	  
the	  reaction,	  four	  Oxygen	  atoms	  move	  to	  form	  a	  molecule	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	  and	  two	  
water	   molecules.	   It	   does	   not	   matter	  which	   of	   the	   four	   atoms	   move	   to	   the	   carbon	  
dioxide	  molecule;	  the	  result	  is	  the	  same	  whatever	  they	  are.	  	  Entities	  of	  this	  kind	  should	  
not	  be	  treated	  as	  individuals	  in	  the	  standard	  sense.	  	  
	  
Another	   typical	   example	   is	   the	   case	   of	   two	   electrons	   of	   an	   Helium	   atom	   in	   the	  
fundamental	  state;	  according	  to	  quantum	  mechanics,	  as	  is	  well	  known,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  
one	  of	  them	  has	  spin	  up	  in	  a	  given	  direction,	  while	  the	  another	  one	  has	  spin	  down	  (in	  
the	  same	  direction),	  but	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  say	  which	  is	  which.	  Some	  philosophers	  claim	  
that	   once	   a	   collection	   of	   objects	   has	   a	   cardinal,	   they	   necessarily	   are	   individuals,	  
presenting	   identity	   (see	   Dorato	   and	  Morganti	   2013).	   However,	   this	   is	   necessarily	   so	  
only	  when	  one	  follows	  the	  accounts	  of	  cardinality	  that	  are	  closely	  related	  to	  identity,	  
something	  we	  are	  not	   required	   to	  do;	   really,	   quasi-­‐set	   theory	   shows	   that	   there	  may	  
exist	  collections	  (quasi-­‐sets)	  of	  objects	  having	  a	  cardinal	  greater	  than	  one,	  but	  being	  so	  
that	  the	  elements	  are	  non-­‐individuals	  (see	  French	  and	  Krause	  2006,	  chap.7	  and,	  for	  a	  
more	  developed	  argumentation	  against	  the	  view	  that	  cardinality	  and	  identity	  must	  be	  
related	  see	  Arenhart	  2012	  and	  Arenhart	  and	  Krause	  2014).	  What	  really	  matters	  for	  us	  
is	   that	   individuality	   and	   non-­‐individuality	   may	   live	   together,	   and	   that	   even	   if	   some	  
things	  are	  individuals	  and	  do	  have	  identity,	  from	  this	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  identity	  is	  
fundamental.	  	  
	  Now,	  about	  the	  requirement	  of	  re-­‐identification,	  we	  can	  say	  is	  that	  it	  is	  very	  unusual	  to	  
characterize	   individuality	  by	  using	  such	  a	   feature.	   In	   fact,	   it	  seems	  to	  say	   little	   to	  say	  
that	  what	  makes	  Socrates	  exactly	  what	  he	   is	  and	  nothing	  else	  somehow	  depends	  on	  
re-­‐identification.	  Furthermore,	  notice	  that	  once	  again,	  by	  the	  way	  it	  is	  posed	  by	  Bueno,	  
the	  condition	  has	  an	  epistemic	  connotation,	  conflating	  metaphysics	  and	  epistemology:	  
individuals	  can	  be	  re-­‐identified,	  at	  least	  in	  principle.	  So,	  if	  in	  some	  situation	  no	  one	  can	  
ever	  re-­‐identify	  an	  individual,	  that	  would	  not	  make	  it	  less	  an	  individual.	  It	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  
definition.	  	  
	  
Also,	   recall	   that	   the	  kind	  of	   identity	   required	   to	  make	  such	   identifications	  possible	   is	  
still	   another	   kind	   of	   identity	   than	   that	  we	   have	   already	   discussed:	   it	   is	   identity	   over	  
time.	  The	  demands	  for	  identity	  over	  time	  are	  distinct	  from	  the	  demands	  on	  synchronic	  
identity,	  which	   is	   the	  one	   required	   for	   individuality.	  As	  we	  mentioned,	   it	   is	  not	   clear	  
which	  kind	  of	   identity	   is	   to	  be	   fundamental,	  nor	  whether	  all	   these	  distinct	   senses	  of	  
identity	  are	  the	  same,	  or	  even	  equally	  fundamental.	  	  
	  
2.3.	  The	  indefinability	  of	  identity	  
	  
Bueno’s	   next	   step	   is	   to	   consider	   the	   definition	   of	   identity	   or,	   as	   he	   says,	   its	  
“indefinability”.	  According	   to	  Bueno,	   identity	   is	   not	  definable,	   not	   even	   in	   languages	  
which	   are	   usually	   thought	   to	   have	   the	   resources	   for	   such	   a	   definition.	  He	   is	   right	   in	  
saying	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  numerical	   identity	  cannot	  be	  defined	  within	  the	  contexts	  of	  
standard	  logic.	  Classical	  logic	  (either	  of	  first	  or	  of	  higher-­‐order)	  deals	  with	  domains	  of	  
objects	  that	  are	  usually	  thought	  of	  as	  sets	  (without	   loss	  of	  generality)	   in	  a	  set	  theory	  
like	   ZFC.	   In	   standard	   semantics,	   the	   alleged	   identity	   to	   be	   defined	   in	   the	   syntactical	  
counterpart	   of	   our	   logic	   would	   be	   a	   relation	   which	   would	   be	   interpreted	   in	   the	  
diagonal	  of	   the	  domain	  D	   (let	  us	  suppose	  for	  now	  first-­‐order	   logic	  only),	  namely,	   the	  
set	   ∆= {< 𝑥, 𝑥 >∶ 𝑥 ∈ 𝐷}.	   As	   is	   well	   known,	   there	   is	   no	   way	   of	   defining	   or	   giving	  
suitable	   first-­‐order	   postulates	   for	   a	   binary	   predicate	   that	   has	   ∆	   as	   its	   sole	  
interpretation	  (the	  proof	  is	  reproduced	  in	  French	  and	  Krause	  (2006),	  p.253-­‐3).	  Even	  in	  
higher-­‐order	   logics,	  where	   identity	   can	  be	   defined	   in	   the	  Whitehead-­‐Russell’s	   sense,	  
namely,	  𝑥 = 𝑦 ≔   ∀𝑃 𝑃𝑥 ↔ 𝑃𝑦     (Leibniz	  Law),	  where	  P	   is	  a	  variable	  of	  suitable	  type	  
and	  x	  and	  y	  are	  of	  the	  same	  type,	  truly	  does	  not	  define	  identity	  in	  the	  required	  sense,	  
for	  we	  can	  easily	  present	  Henkin	  models	  comprising	  things	  that	  obey	  this	  definition	  but	  
which	   are	   not	   the	   very	   same	   object	   (again,	   French	   and	   Krause,	   op.cit.	   present	   an	  
example	  at	  p.257).	  	  
	  
However,	  Bueno	  is	  not	  considering	  such	  well-­‐known	  results	  when	  he	  says	  that	  identity	  
cannot	  be	  defined.	   In	   fact,	   in	  higher-­‐order	   languages	   restricted	   to	   so-­‐called	  standard	  
models,	  identity	  can	  be	  defined	  following	  the	  Whitehead-­‐Russell	  definition	  above.	  So,	  
how	  can	  Bueno	  claim	  that	  identity	  is	  not	  definable	  in	  such	  languages?	  The	  idea	  is	  not	  
that	  these	  definitions	  violate	  some	  condition	  on	  definability	  or	  that	  they	  do	  not	  have	  
the	  correct	  models.	  Bueno	  makes	  his	  point	  with	  a	  remark	  concerning	  Leibniz	  Law	  (the	  
formula	   used	   in	   the	  Whitehead-­‐Russell	   definition)	   in	   saying	   that	   in	   formulating	   the	  
definition,	  identity	  is	  presupposed	  “given	  that	  the	  variables	  occurring	  on	  the	  left-­‐hand	  
side	  of	  the	  bi-­‐conditional	  [our	  `:=’	  above]	  need	  to	  be	  the	  same	  as	  those	  occurring	  in	  the	  
right-­‐hand	  side”.	  In	  this	  criticism,	  Bueno	  follows	  McGinn	  2000:	  we	  must	  use	  identity	  in	  
order	  to	  state	  the	  definition	  of	  identity	  and	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  definition.	  So,	  
identity	  is	  not	  definable,	  and	  not	  being	  definable,	  it	  is	  fundamental.	  
	  
However,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  of	  questioning	  identity.	  The	  two	  exes	  in	  the	  Leibniz	  Law	  
are	   instances	   of	   the	   same	   abstract	   object	   (a	   variable).	   Of	   course	   in	   elaborating	   our	  
conceptual	  schemes,	  we	  need	  to	  discern	  things	  such	  as	  the	  letters	  a	  and	  b.	  We	  reason	  
in	  an	  almost	  constructive	  way,	  starting	  from	  standard	  things	  we	  are	  accustomed	  with,	  
and	  step	  by	  step	  we	  go	  to	  more	  and	  more	  sophisticated	  conceptual	  schemes	  until	  we	  
arrive,	  say,	  at	  a	  strong	  theory	  such	  as	  the	  ZFC	  system.	  Then,	  as	  suggested	  by	  Kunen,	  we	  
enter	   this	   system	   and	   revise	   our	   steps,	   perhaps	   understanding	   what	   we	   have	   done	  
before.	  As	  an	  example,	  in	  order	  to	  elaborate	  arithmetics,	  we	  need	  to	  have	  the	  notion	  
of	  ‘two’	  (in	  order	  to	  be	  aware	  that	  we	  have	  two	  different	  symbols	  in	  our	  language),	  but	  
only	   after	   having	   developed	   arithmetics	   itself	   we	   can	   (supposedly)	   get	   an	  
understanding	   about	   what	   ‘two’	   is	   intended	   to	   mean.	   As	   Kunen	   says,	   “formal	   logic	  
must	  be	  developed	  twice”	   (Kunen	  2009,	  p.191).	  This	   is	  so	  also	  with	  other	  systems	  of	  
logic	   and	   mathematics.	   For	   instance,	   paraconsistent	   logics	   and	   paraconsistent	   set	  
theories	  make	  use	  of	   the	  basic	   idea	   that	   a	  proposition	  and	   its	  negation	   can	  both	  be	  
true	   (Béziau	   2003;	   Arenhart	   and	   Krause	   2014a).	   But	   in	   formulating	   such	   a	   logic,	  we	  
assume	  that	  nothing	  is	  an	  axiom	  and	  not	  an	  axiom	  at	  once.	  That	   is,	   in	  the	  metalevel,	  
we	  assume	  something	   that	   resembles	  classical	   logic	   (or	  at	   least	  a	  constructive	   logic).	  
But	  even	  assuming	  the	  validity	  of	  things	  like	  the	  Principle	  of	  Contradiction,	  we	  arrive	  at	  
systems	  that	  violate	  it.	  Furthermore,	  the	  definition	  of	  identity	  given	  by	  Leibniz	  Law	  can	  
be	   said	   to	   be	   formulated	   in	   a	   part	   of	   our	   framework	   where	   identity	   makes	   sense,	  
although	   it	  does	  not	  hold	   for	   some	  objects	  of	  our	   intended	  domain.	  This	  happens	   in	  
particular	   in	   quasi-­‐set	   theory,	   where	   in	   its	   ‘classical’	   part,	   the	   objects	   obey	   classical	  
logic.	  	  
	  
Kunen’s	  claim	  holds	  also	  here.	  We	  may	  start	  by	  using	  a	  very	  rough	  intuitive	  notion	  of	  
identity	  and	  difference	  of	  course,	  and	  by	  using	  them	  we	  may	  arrive	  at	  strong	  systems	  
in	  which	  these	  very	  notions	  can	  be	  questioned	  and	  even	  eliminated	  for	  the	  objects	  the	  
theories	   are	   supposed	   to	   apply.	   The	   fact	   that	   we	   use	   identity	   in	   elaborating	   our	  
conceptual	  schemes	  does	  not	  force	  upon	  us	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  objects	  we	  are	  dealing	  
with,	  and	  this	   is	  the	  point	  to	  be	  emphasized.	  This,	  we	  think,	  answers	  Bueno’s	  related	  
claims	  concerning	  propositional	  logic.	  In	  fact,	  in	  the	  language	  of	  classical	  propositional	  
logic,	   the	   occurrences	   of	  A	   in	  𝐴 ∨¬𝐴	   are	   occurrences	   of	   the	   same	   variable,	   but	  we	  
could	  simply	  say	  that	  they	  are	  two	  occurrences	  of	  the	  variable	  A	  without	  mentioning	  
identity	  at	  all,	   just	  by	  emphasizing	  the	  number	  (as	  we	  made	  before,	  by	  distinguishing	  
the	  various	  tokens	  of	  a	  type).	  Anyway,	  this	  use	  of	  identity	  is	  in	  another	  level	  than	  that	  
one	  which	  questions	   its	  applicability	   to	  a	  certain	   realm.	   Indeed,	   this	  notion	  does	  not	  
matter	   for	   the	   possible	   consideration	   of	   a	   metaphysics	   involving	   objects	   like	   the	  
quantum	  non-­‐individuals.	  As	  a	  further	  remark,	  let	  us	  mention	  that	  there	  is	  a	  theory	  of	  
multisets	  (Blizard	  1988);	  roughly	  speaking,	  a	  multiset	  is	  a	  collection	  of	  objects	  where	  a	  
certain	  element	  may	  appear	  more	   than	  once,	  and	   the	  number	  of	  occurrences	  of	   the	  
elements	   are	   relevant	   for	   the	   cardinal	   of	   the	   collection.	   For	   instance,	   while	  
{1,1,2,3,3,3}	   has	   cardinal	   3	   in	   a	   standard	   set	   theory	   like	   ZF,	   in	  multiset	   theory	   if	   has	  
cardinal	   6.	  A	  quasi-­‐set	   is	  not	   a	  multiset.	   In	   a	  multiset,	   it	   is	   the	   same	   element	   that	   is	  
counted	   more	   that	   once,	   while	   in	   a	   quasi-­‐set,	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   some	   of	   the	  
elements	  may	  lack	   identity,	  we	  cannot	  say	  that,	  but	  only	  that	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  entity	  
may	   appear	  more	   than	   once.	   Anyway,	   the	   cardinal	   number	   of	   the	   collection	  makes	  
sense,	  even	  without	  identity	  conditions.	  
	  
2.4.	  Quantification	  and	  identity	  
	  
The	  next	  claim	  by	  Bueno	  concerns	  identity	  and	  quantifiers.	  According	  to	  him,	  in	  order	  
for	   quantifiers	   to	   make	   sense,	   we	   must	   have	   identity	   as	   applied	   to	   all	   elements.	  
Intuitively	   speaking,	   “for	   all”	   means	   “for	   each”,	   thus,	   if	   we	   say	   that	   for	   all	   even	  
numbers	  some	  property	  holds,	  than	  it	  holds	  for	  0,	  for	  2,	  for	  4,	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  this	  sense,	  
we	  need	  to	  identify	  all	  elements	  of	  the	  domain,	  hence,	  they	  must	  ‘have	  identity’.	  But	  
this	  is	  just	  an	  interpretation.	  For	  instance,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  rule	  of	  universal	  
generalization,	  namely,	  that	  from	  Fa	  it	  follows	  ∀xFx,	  being	  a	  is	  arbitrary	  in	  Fa	  (that	  is,	  a	  
‘parameter’,	  not	  a	  proper	  name	  of	  an	  individual	  object),	  we	  must	  know	  in	  advance	  that	  
“each	   distinct	   object	   in	   the	   domain	   is	   in	   the	   range	   of	   the	   universal	   quantifier”.	  
Furthermore,	  we	  must	  know	  that	  there	  is	  no	  object	  in	  the	  domain	  distinct	  from	  a	  that	  
is	  ‘not-­‐F’.	  Identity	  is	  involved	  in	  such	  claims,	  and	  so,	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  quantifiers,	  it	  
seems,	  requires	  identity.	  	  
	  
However,	  things	  are	  not	  so	  drastic	  as	  they	  seem.	  In	  the	  first	  place,	  one	  could	  apply	  a	  
proof-­‐theoretic	  kind	  of	  semantics	  in	  which	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  quantifiers	  are	  fixed	  by	  
the	   syntactical	   rules	  we	  use	   for	   such	   logical	   constants,	   such	   as	   the	   standard	  ones	   in	  
first-­‐order	   or	   in	   higher-­‐order	   logics,	   and	   nothing	   about	   the	   domain	   is	   said	   from	   this	  
purely	   formal	  point	  of	  view.	   	  According	  to	  this	  approach,	   the	  way	  quantifiers	  work	   is	  
determined	  by	  the	  axioms	  we	  use,	  and	  not	  by	  the	  intended	  interpretation	  we	  have	  for	  
them	   on	   a	   Tarski-­‐style	   semantics.	   So,	   universal	   quantifier	   gets	   its	   meaning	  
independently	  of	  identity.	  	  
	  
For	  an	  alternative,	  consider	  the	  rule	  that	  goes	  from	  Fa	  to	  ∀xFx,	  with	  the	  proviso	  that	  a	  
is	  arbitrary	  (i.e.	  a	  parameter).	  The	  only	  sense	  Bueno	  sees	  in	  this	  is	  that	  for	  each	  object	  
of	   the	   domain,	   it	   has	   F.	   However,	   even	   in	   classical	   semantics,	   one	   can	   have	   an	  
alternative	  interpretation	  that	  goes	  without	  mentioning	  each	  object	  of	  the	  domain:	  it	  
is	  related	  to	  the	  approach	  to	  generalized	  quantifiers.	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  call	  |F|	  the	  class	  of	  
objects	  of	  the	  domain	  that	  have	  F,	  and	  let	  D	  be	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  interpretation.	  The	  
interpretation	  for	  ∀xFx	  can	  now	  be	  stated	  simply	  as	  saying	  that	  D	   is	  a	  subset	  of	  |F|.	  	  
For	   instance,	   we	   may	   say	   that	   |F|	   is	   the	   class	   of	   all	   (just	   two)	   Oxygen	   atoms	   in	   a	  
molecule	  of	  O2	  without	  need	  of	  identifying	  them.	  	  
In	  the	  same	  vein,	  the	  interpretation	  for	  ∃xFx	  means	  that	  |F|	  is	  not	  empty.	  For	  instance,	  
we	  may	  say	  that	   in	  an	  Helium	  atom	  in	  the	  fundamental	  state,	  we	  may	  say	  that	  there	  
exists	  one	  electron	  with	  spin	  UP	  in	  a	  given	  direction,	  without	  need	  of	  identify	  it	  (really,	  
this	   is	   impossible	   according	   to	   standard	   quantum	  mechanics).	   In	   neither	  mentioned	  
case	   it	   is	   required	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   objects	   being	   quantified.	   Furthermore,	   this	  
interpretation	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  being	  generalizable	  and	  also	  of	  taking	  seriously	  the	  
idea	  that	  a	  quantifier	  is	  a	  higher-­‐level	  predicate.	  	  
	  
The	   interpretation	   sketched	   in	   the	   last	   paragraph	   has	   another	   advantage:	   it	   can	   be	  
employed	   to	   provide	   an	   interpretation	   for	   quantifiers	   in	   metalanguages	   without	  
identity,	   like	   quasi-­‐set	   theory.	   Given	   that	   this	   can	   be	   done,	   it	   seems	   for	   us	   that	   the	  
claim	  that	   identity	   is	   required	   to	  make	  sense	  of	  quantifiers	  does	  not	  go	   through	   (for	  
further	  discussions	  on	  this	  problem,	  see	  Arenhart	  2014).	  	  
	  
In	  such	  interpretations	  we	  also	  have	  an	  answer	  to	  another	  claim	  made	  by	  Bueno:	  that	  
to	  make	  sense	  of	  universal	  generalization	  (from	  Fa	  to	  infer	  ∀xFx),	  we	  must	  make	  sure	  
that	  there	  is	  no	  object	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  interpretation	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  a	  and	  that	  it	  
is	  a	   ‘not-­‐F’.	  According	  to	  our	  proposal,	  all	   that	  needs	  to	  be	  assured	   in	  order	   to	  grant	  
that	  the	  rule	  works,	  besides	  the	  interpretation	  above,	  is	  that	  we	  make	  sure	  that	  there	  
is	  nothing	  discernible	  from	  a	  that	  is	  a	  not-­‐F.	  In	  fact,	  everything	  indiscernible	  from	  a	  will	  
automatically	  be	  an	  F,	  otherwise	  they	  would	   	  be	  not	   	   indiscernible	  from	  a.	  So,	  all	  we	  
need	   to	   take	   into	   account	   is	   discernibility,	   a	   relation	  we	  have	   already	   claimed	   to	  be	  
strictly	  weaker	  than	  identity.	  So,	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  quantifiers,	  we	  need	  much	  less	  than	  
the	  whole	  identity.	  	  
	  
This	   argument	   also	   works	   to	   solve	   the	   problem	   posed	   by	   Bueno	   of	   the	   collapse	   of	  
existential	   and	   universal	   quantifiers.	   According	   to	   Bueno,	   if	   we	   do	   not	   take	   into	  
account	  that	  a	  is	  arbitrary	  in	  the	  inference	  from	  Fa	  to	  ∀xFx,	  and	  that	  a	  is	  not	  arbitrary	  
in	  the	  inference	  from	  Fa	  to	  ∃xFx,	  both	  quantifiers	  end	  up	  collapsing.	  Identity	  is	  needed	  
for	  that	  distinction,	  because	  a	  is	  said	  to	  be	  arbitrary	  in	  Fa,	  recall,	  when	  we	  are	  able	  to	  
determine	  that	  no	  object	  distinct	  from	  a	  	  is	  not	  an	  F.	  However,	  with	  the	  interpretation	  
sketched	  above,	   and	   taking	   into	   account	  only	  discernibility,	   and	  not	   identity,	  we	  are	  
able	  to	  show	  that	  quantifiers	  do	  not	  collapse.	  	  
	  
3.	  Identity	  and	  quantum	  mechanics	  
	  Bueno	  still	  makes	  a	  further	  point	   in	  connection	  with	  his	  claim	  that	  quantifiers	  do	  not	  
make	  sense	  without	   identity.	  He	  relates	  such	  an	   issue	  with	  the	  consequent	  failure	  of	  
an	   interpretation	   of	   quantum	   mechanics	   in	   which	   not	   every	   object	   has	   identity.	  
According	  to	  Bueno,	  if	  his	  arguments	  are	  correct,	  the	  interpretation	  should	  not	  work.	  	  
	  
However,	   if	   our	   above	   arguments	   are	   correct,	   then	   the	   relation	  of	   identity	   is	   not	   so	  
precious	   that	   it	   cannot	   go	   out	   at	   least	   in	   some	   domains	   of	   interpretation.	   Bueno	  
advances	   against	   such	   an	   attempt	   another	   charge:	   that	   we	   cannot	   make	   sense	   of	  
cardinality	   of	   collections	   without	   identity.	   So,	   in	   the	   interpretations	   of	   quantum	  
mechanics	   according	   to	   which	   objects	   do	   not	   have	   identity,	   we	   would	   not	   be	   able,	  
according	  to	  Bueno,	  to	  keep	  a	  cardinal	  for	  collections	  of	  such	  entities	  (see	  French	  and	  
Krause	   2006,	   chap.	   4	   for	   further	   discussions	   on	   the	   non-­‐individuals	   in	   quantum	  
mechanics).	  	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  procedures	  used	  to	  establish	  a	  cardinal	   in	  quantum	  contexts,	  one,	  that	  is,	  
that	  allegedly	  does	  not	  requires	   identity,	   is	  criticized	  by	  Bueno.	  According	  to	  such	  an	  
approach,	  first	  presented	  by	  Domenech	  and	  Holik	  2007,	  we	  may	  count	  the	  electrons	  in	  
a	  Helium	  atom	  by	  putting	   it	   in	  a	  cloud	  chamber	  and	  using	  radiation	  to	   ionize	   it.	   	  We	  
observe	  the	  track	  of	  an	  ion	  and	  the	  track	  of	  an	  electron.	  By	  repeating	  the	  procedure,	  
we	  discover	  that	  only	  two	  electrons	  can	  be	  extracted	  by	  such	  a	  procedure.	  The	  whole	  
point	   is	   that	   by	   employing	   this	   approach	   we	   do	   not	   need	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	  
identity	  of	  the	  extracted	  electrons.	  All	  that	  matters	  is	  that	  we	  have	  two	  electrons.	  	  
	  
Against	  these,	  Bueno	  states	  that	  in	  order	  to	  grant	  that	  we	  have	  two	  electrons,	  we	  must	  
make	   sure	   that	   the	   extracted	   electrons	   are	   not	   the	   same,	   that	   each	   time	  we	   apply	  
radiation	  we	   are	   extracting	   a	   new	  electron,	   that	   is,	   one	   that	   is	   not	   the	   same	   as	   the	  
previous	  one.	  Otherwise,	  we	   cannot	  make	   sure	  we	  are	  not	   counting	   the	   same	   thing	  
twice.	  
	  
Notice	   that	   this	   goes	   straight	   against	   the	   idea	   that	   one	   can	   interpret	   quantum	  
mechanics	  as	  comprised	  of	  entities	  without	  identity	  but	  with	  a	  definite	  cardinal.	  So,	  to	  
grant	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   project	   we	   must	   grant	   that	   this	   criticism	   is	   not	   well	  
placed.	  And,	  indeed,	  we	  believe	  it	  is	  not	  correct.	  	  
	  
First	  of	  all,	  we	  grant	  that	  the	  experiment	  can	  be	  described	  as	  extracting	  two	  different	  
electrons.	  We	  hold,	  however,	  that	  it	  need	  not	  be	  so.	  We	  can,	  for	  instance,	  absorb	  each	  
electron	  that	  is	  extracted	  from	  the	  atom,	  so	  that	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  an	  electron	  is	  
not	   being	   counted	   twice.	   Furthermore,	   we	   may	   produce	   alternative	   counting	  
procedures,	  such	  as	  weighting,	   in	  which,	  given	  that	  we	  know	  the	  kind	  of	  particles	  we	  
have	  in	  a	  state,	  and	  given	  that	  we	  know	  the	  mass	  of	  each	  such	  an	  element	  (remember	  
that	   they	  are	  nomological,	  after	  all),	  we	  can	  determine	  how	  many	  objects	   there	  are.	  
This	  procedure	   involves	  no	  extraction,	  and	  no	  claim	  of	  the	   identities	  of	  the	  elements	  
need	   be	  made.	   So,	   in	   the	   end,	   cardinality	  may	   very	   clearly	   be	   seen	   as	   independent	  




We	  conclude	  that	  the	  claim	  that	  identity	  is	  fundamental,	  according	  to	  Bueno,	  does	  not	  
go	  through.	  Almost	  every	  claim	  made	  to	  establish	  this	  thesis	  can	  be	  either	  shown	  not	  
to	  achieve	  its	  goal	  or	  else	  to	  be	  amenable	  to	  be	  paraphrased	  in	  terms	  of	  discernibility.	  
So,	   in	  the	  end,	   it	  seems	  that	  the	  most	  we	  need	  is	  a	  discernibility	  relation,	  which	   is	   in	  
fact	  closer	  to	  our	  everyday	  necessities.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  as	  we	  have	  mentioned	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  paper,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  for	  us	  
what	  Bueno	  meant	  by	  “identity”	  and	  by	  “fundamental”.	  We	  hope	  to	  have	  shown	  that,	  
whatever	   the	   senses	   these	   words	   may	   have,	   in	   the	   context	   that	   they	   are	   used	   by	  
Bueno,	   the	   idea	   that	   identity	   is	   fundamental	   does	   not	   get	   established	   by	   his	  
arguments.	   We	   would	   even	   go	   further	   in	   claiming	   that	   identity	   is,	   for	   practical	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